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externalities. However, non-benevolent politicians may not choose efficient policies. Real-
world examples indicate that politicians tend to concentrate on externalities at the mature 
stage of the lifecycle. These externalities may be transitory or at the expense of foreign 
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1. Introduction 
One central element of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy is to make Europe “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economic region in the world” by 2010. 
Although there are many different ways to reach this goal, the idea of an industrial 
policy that promotes European or national champions as the best way to compete in a 
globalized world has become (again) en vogue among European politicians. 
While the desirability of promoting champions is the object of much discussion, it is not 
always clear what a champion is, nor what type of champion will receive the most 
attention from politicians (Maincent and Navarro 2006). In a rapidly changing business 
environment, national champions can be up and coming firms engaged in creative 
destruction, innovative firms operating at or close to the technology frontier, or large 
firms that serve to confer prestige on the politicians who support and protect them. In 
this chapter, we argue that these different types of champions occur at different phases 
of a product lifecycle. According to Gort and Klepper’s (1982) knowledge-based view, 
the phases along a product lifecycle are defined as follows. The very “early” phase is 
best characterized by experimentation undertaken in the quest for a dominant product 
variant – leading to high firm turnover. In the “intermediate” phase, some product 
variants dominate the growing market – leading to firm growth and firm entry but very 
little exit. In the “mature” phase, firms concentrate on process innovations so as to 
reduce production costs and there will be a certain amount of market entry by new firms 
that do very little of their own research but, instead, simply copy the now established 
product and benefit from low production costs (e.g., a low-paid workforce). Once 
confronted by competition from these low-cost firms, national firms must keep pace   3
with the speed of process innovation, develop new products along another lifecycle, or 
exit the market (see also Klepper, 1996, 1997). We argue that different knowledge 
externalities are generated in each stage, and that these may warrant government 
intervention, to foster investment and efficient redeployment of assets. While this 
theoretical result holds for a benevolent government, examples of costly policies by 
politicians concerned with reelection are also discussed. 
Competitive pressure and innovation 
According to Aghion et al. (2008), for firms at the technology frontier, constant 
innovation is the only way to escape competition, either from new entrants or existing 
firms. Competition should thus provide a disciplining effect on firms, and lead to 
innovation. However, firm failure only occurs in competitive markets. If a firm feels 
fairly confident that the government will protect and support it, no matter what its 
position in the market, the firm will most likely not spend much time, money, or effort 
on innovation. This innovation-inhibiting situation is even more likely to manifest when 
the politicians supporting the firm are up for reelection (Dewatripont and Seabright, 
2006), as voters are uncomfortable with an economy founded on unpredictable firm 
selection (leading to fast but erratic growth) and prefer slow but smooth growth (Roe, 
2003). In consequence, politicians seeking reelection will prefer to subsidize those firms 
or industries that are in danger of becoming losers in a process of creative destruction. 
Because firms are very well aware of this, their incentive to invest in research, to 
innovate, and to relocate their assets in more profitable activities is reduced.   4
Promoting national champions under externalities 
In this chapter, we focus on industries where firms need to innovate and develop new 
products to survive. Despite the adverse effect just described, there may still be a 
rationale for a benevolent politician to intervene at some stage of the lifecycle. Several 
market imperfections may justify intervention. First, competition is unlikely to lead to 
efficient levels of innovation and of redeployment of assets in the presence of 
externalities and information leakages. We will argue that such externalities are 
important in the industries we consider. Second, competition may also not lead to 
efficiency in the presence of imperfect credit markets. Therefore, we consider two types 
of intervention that may improve overall efficiency, namely subsidizing innovative 
firms in their early stages, and protecting mature ones from competition. We compare 
the impact of these two ways of promoting national champions under the assumption of 
a benevolent politician. In doing so, we consider the case in which both forms of 
intervention reinforce the incentive of local firms to invest in R&D activity. This will be 
particularly beneficial when such investments generate positive local externalities, 
including, for example, tacit knowledge acquired by firms and employees and/or 
processes adopted from other industries (such spillovers are commonly assumed in the 
endogenous growth literature). Some form of intervention is also beneficial when 
competitors may copy a new good or technology without bearing R&D costs – thus 
expropriating, to some extent, the research efforts of innovators. However, as we will 
argue, the investments undertaken due to government intervention may not be adequate. 
The existing champions-related literature concentrates on the distribution of rents. Not 
surprisingly, a large part of this literature finds its foundation in the strategic trade   5
policy literature. In this latter strand of research, markets are characterized by 
worldwide imperfect competition and suppliers from around the world compete to 
capture excess rents. To retain the largest possible share of these excess rents within 
national borders, governments may artificially bolster the position of domestic firms, for 
instance, through state aid. Spencer and Brander (1983) offer a theory of government 
intervention that provides an explanation for industrial strategy: domestic net welfare is 
improved by capturing a greater share of the output of rent-earning industries. However, 
this can result in a collectively wasteful subsidy war. 
In our contribution, we adopt a different approach and focus on how governmental 
intervention alters incentives to (1) invest in R&D in the early phase of the lifecycle and 
(2) relocate resources in later phases of the lifecycle when the product becomes mature. 
In our very simple model, firms initially decide whether or not to invest in research, and 
later on, whether to change activities, given that there are informational spillovers. On 
the one hand, these spillovers may allow imitation, thus discouraging investment in 
research. On the other hand, knowledge spillovers are known to be an important 
location factor in support of regional agglomeration, leading to positive external 
economies. Hence, there is a dual nature to information spillovers. Accordingly, we 
assess the impact of subsidizing research during the early stage and protecting firms in 
mature industries. Subsidies and aid to domestic firms are widespread and may benefit 
from an exemption from European Commission (EC) rules if they “facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities (…) or economic areas” (art. 87, EC 
Treaty). Protection is also far from unusual and the recent merger between the two 
French firms EDF and Suez, protecting the latter from hostile takeover by non-French   6
companies, may provide an example of it. While we obtain theoretical justifications for 
intervention when assuming benevolent politicians, real-world politicians are more 
likely to be motivated by re-election concerns. To underline this, we provide 
illustrations drawn from actual experience of inefficient promotion of national 
champions. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in more detail 
the way champions operate at different phases of the lifecycle, with a special focus on 
politician incentive to promote such champions. Section 3 introduces a simple model of 
a champions-related policy along the lifecycle. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to real-
world illustrations: Section 4 provides examples of the importance of knowledge and its 
diffusion at a local level, while Section 5 illustrates how the promotion of national 
champions may stem from private interest, either that of firms near bankruptcy, or that 
related to large-scale projects with high visibility. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Promoting Champions along a Lifecycle 
Champions in the early phase of the lifecycle 
The early phase of the lifecycle is characterized by experimentation. Here, customer 
preferences are diverse and entrepreneurial virtues, such as flexibility and openness to 
the unexpected, are needed to address these preferences. High responsiveness to 
consumer preferences and willingness to experiment with processes borrowed from 
other industries are essential to success. This experimentation phase is characterized by 
high firm turnover, which leads to fruitful innovation, on the one hand, but, on the other   7
hand, makes scale economies in production unlikely, a topic well discussed in the 
“infant industry” literature. The infant industry arguments were initially formulated by 
Alexander Hamilton at the end of the 18th century, and then expanded by Friedrich List, 
most particularly in his 1941 book, The National System of Political Economy. John 
Stuart Mill believed that industries should be protected only temporarily, that is, while 
they are learning new technologies. More recent studies have defined and restricted the 
applicability of the theory (see, e.g., Bardhan, 1971). Champions in this early phase of 
the lifecycle can be described as entrepreneurial firms. 
As argued above, politicians seeking reelection are reluctant to have fast but erratic 
growth and prefer slow but smooth growth (Roe, 2003). They are strongly motivated to 
smooth the evolution of the early phase of the lifecycle—a process best described as 
creative destruction. Schumpeter (1942:85) describes it as follows: “But …, it is not the 
kind of [price] competition which counts but the competition for the new commodity, 
the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-
scale unit of control for instance)—competition which commands a decisive cost or 
quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of 
the existing firms, but at their foundations and at their very lives.” However, this 
attempt to smooth the evolution of the early stage of the lifecycle may have severe 
consequences, and can, ironically enough, even result in destroying the process of 
creative destruction itself. Seabright (2005) argues that incumbent firms expanding into 
the infant industry sector are the greatest beneficiaries of public subsidizing as they are 
already politically well connected, i.e., they are successful lobbyists. Such a policy 
harms the process of creative destruction in two ways. First, concentrating on incumbent   8
firms prevents the positive effects of what Aghion et al. (2008) term “entry-
competition,” i.e., competition resulting from the threat of new entry. Furthermore, 
politicians are reluctant to admit that one of their projects has failed unless they are 
absolutely forced to by some spectacular or public event. However, allowing projects to 
fail and disappear is an important part of the process as creative destruction. 
Champions in the intermediate phase of the lifecycle 
Once the industry matures, firms having successfully emerged from the early phase of 
the lifecycle now begin to realize economies of scale in production as the number of 
product variants narrows. At this stage, firms improve and extend the selected variants 
in an increasingly routinized and predictable process. At the beginning of this phase, the 
opportunity for dramatic product improvements (not innovations) along with excess 
profits attracts new entry. With time, the resulting competition creates a need for 
constant innovation as the only way to survive. Given the importance of successful 
innovation, R&D activities and knowledge production become an internal, 
bureaucratically controlled process in large firms and their key suppliers. The 
routinization of the innovation process increases the predictability of its outcome and 
thus contributes to firm competitiveness (Baumol, 2002a). Towards the end of this 
phase, products become increasingly routinized and subsequent (incremental) 
innovations depend largely on previous experience. When combined with decreasing 
excess profits due to the larger number of market participants, this eventually creates a 
barrier for new entry. However, internal innovation and scale economies together result 
in rapidly-growing firms. We call these firms routinized firms.   9
In this phase of the lifecycle, politicians, regardless of their reelection goals, have no 
incentive to intervene as growth is smooth and stable. Routinized firm innovation “tends 
to be conservative, seeking products whose applicability is clear and whose markets are 
relatively not speculative. The bureaucratic control typical of innovative activity in the 
large firm serves to ensure that the resulting changes will be modest, predictable and 
incremental” (Baumol, 2002b). Accordingly, as firm exit is rare during this intermediate 
phase of the lifecycle and the number of firms generally increases, there is no need for 
politicians to interfere or intervene. 
Champions in the mature phase of the lifecycle 
In the mature phase of the lifecycle, a small number of product variants dominates the 
market. Firms now concentrate on process innovation in order to make the production 
process more effective. These process innovations originate from the firm’s internal 
learning-by-doing. Competitors that cannot keep pace with the speed of process 
innovation are forced to exit the market. 
Some firms in the mature phase of the lifecycle can best be described as big projects, 
because of their size or because of the media coverage their projects attract. Politician 
seeking reelection may be inclined to subsidize these big projects in order to prevent 
their market exit, even though exit and, again, creative destruction is the driving force 
behind process innovation at this phase of the lifecycle. Seabright (2005) asks: “What 
do we know about the biases of politicians in selecting investment projects for public 
support? They tend to be large, they tend to produce products that are highly visible in 
the press and media (affording many photo-opportunities for the politicians concerned),   10
and they tend to be comparatively insulated from competition—both because this makes 
them less risky to finance and because it avoids awkward questions about their 
























Figure 1: Stages along the lifecycle (Klepper, 1996) 
Based on empirical findings by Gort and Klepper (1982), Figure 1 illustrates net firm 
entry, i.e., changes in the number of firms over time. Assuming that, in the absence of 
intervention, the number of local firms follows this curve of industry evolution, we 
obtain the following implications. In the early phase, trial and error stimulate the 
process of creative destruction, where exit often quickly follows entry. Many firms, in a 
life or death struggle, are competing to create the dominant product variant which 
results in a relatively high firm turnover rate during this phase of the lifecycle, and a 
relatively low number of firms in the market. As this search process brings about 
winners and losers, we are, again, dealing with a turbulent emerging market, likely to 
attract political attention. In contrast, the second phase of the lifecycle is already 
experiencing growth and thus is less likely to be the focus of political attention. Finally,   11
the mature phase, where efficiency increases cause firm exit, is, again, a stage at which 
politicians are likely to feel tempted to intervene. 
A major objection against such a national-champions policy is that in a period of global 
competition, protectionist policies pursued by one country may give rise to the risk of 
that country falling behind the technology frontier if other countries are relying on 
competition to spur innovation. Such a noncompetitive environment will not strengthen, 
but instead actually weaken, the domestic firms. It deters investment and relocation of 
activities in new products or markets. 
To examine these welfare effects more precisely, the following section isolates and 
formalizes several reasons for subsidizing innovative activities or promoting national 
champions along the three phases of the lifecycle described above. Under the conditions 
spelled out below, the promotion of national champions may be welfare-improving from 
the point of view of the country or region where the national champion is located; 
however, note that, in reality, a policy of promoting national champions may not be 
motivated by political benevolence but by rational politicians maximizing their own 
utility—that is, getting themselves reelected. Thus, our simple analysis provides only an 
initial framework for classifying benevolent reasons to intervene and promote 
champions at a theoretical level.  
 
3. A Simple Model of Intervention in Changing Industries 
We consider a sector in which R&D is necessary to develop new products. Research has 
uncertain results and its outcome is initially confidential, but knowledge eventually   12
leaks out. This happens, for instance, when employees “job hop” from the innovator to 
competitors (Fallick et al., 2006) or simply when competitors reverse engineer the 
innovator’s product or service. An innovator is thus initially protected by secrecy, but 
may later be to some extent expropriated from the research investment as knowledge 
spills over and competitors copy the technology or product. 
3.1. The model 
The invention of new products 
We consider a regional or local “innovator,” for instance, a small or large firm or a 
researcher teamed up with a venture capitalist. We assume for simplicity that there is 
only one such local innovator for the market under consideration (and we abstract from 
internal issues associated with the distribution of rents generated by new ideas, as in 
e.g., Baccara and Razin, 2007). The innovator has initial assets A and must invest a 
fixed amount I,  0 > I , in order to develop a new product. Initial assets A may, or may 
not, be sufficient to finance investment I. After I is invested, the innovator privately 
“invents” a new product with probability p,  1 0 < < p , at Date 0, in which case she 
obtains observable profits at Date 1. 
At this stage, the product can be copied by other firms, which, for the sake of simplicity, 
are assumed to all be foreign (or nonlocal); the investor then loses exclusivity in 
producing the product. We thus assume that perfect protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) is not possible. This is particularly true for noncodifiable knowledge that 
cannot be described in a patent. At Date 2, there is market competition. At this point, the 
innovator may either continue production, or relocate her physical assets and skills (i.e.,   13
her resources) to another activity; this outside option yields expected profits π  and 
consumer surplus CS. These levels depend on the degree of asset specificity. In a fully 
dynamic version of our model, they would be equilibrium values depending on the 
amount of assets redeployed and the level of skills and know-how prevailing locally. 
However, this is clearly outside the scope of this chapter, which is why we will consider 
the outside option benefits as given. 
We use  2 1   and   π π  to denote the profits made by the inventor, and CS1 and CS2 to denote 
local consumer surplus in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Expectations are denoted with 
operator E (with  ) ( 1 2 π π E  being the expected value of Date 2 profits given Date 1 
profits, for instance). 
In addition to consumer surplus and the innovator’s profits, local production of the new 
good may create positive externalities in the area: employees and researchers may 
benefit from learning-by-doing; the innovation may speed other local research projects, 
possibly due to knowledge spillovers (Feldman, 1994; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999); 
local employment may generate complementarities favoring a “big push” (Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1943; Murphy et al., 1989). We denote by Li, 0 ≥ i L , the gains associated with 
these potential externalities at stage i, 2   1,   0, = i . 
We prefer not to assume that the social value of an activity is correlated with its private 
value (contrary to e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1997, in which an increase in investment 
increases both private and social benefits). Depending on the specific sector considered, 
externalities and spillovers may be of more or less value at each stage. Investing in 
innovation (at stage 0) may create a stock of “competencies” and knowledge of value   14
for future projects independently from the success or failure of the initial research; this 
may be particularly likely in the pharmaceutical industry and other industries at the 
frontier of scientific knowledge. In other sectors, most of the value will arise from 
developing a particular product, thereby ensuring that the investment has been 
successful. The benefit then accrues at stage 1, as workers have to create new processes 
and learn by doing. Externalities obtained from mature production at stage 2 are most 
likely to be employment related: the specific employment generated in the field may be 
of additional value, compared to local employment in other sectors, for instance, 
because employment in this field is a better match with local employee skills, or 
because new such skills are developed. Such additional benefits are also likely to arise 
when the region faces high redundancy rates where laid-off employees have difficulty 
finding new jobs. Note that this last type of externality is the most visible one, and thus 
may receive excess media attention compared to the two other types. 
These externalities may motivate government intervention; Accordingly, we denote 
2 1 0 L L pL pL + + =  but also consider the case without externalities ( 0 L = ). 
We assume that government is unable to assess the quality of an innovator’s “idea”—
that is, the profits she will make in case of success,  2 1   and   π π . This assumption is made 
for the sake of simplicity but is not completely unrealistic as it can certainly be argued 
that “innovators” and experts, including specialized venture capitalists, usually have a 
better understanding of the true potential of a new product, software, technology, and so 
forth, than do politicians. We rule out the possibility of using a revelation mechanism to 
obtain this information. In our context, this would require regulation of prices or 
quantities, which would be quite unusual in the industries we are looking at and   15
particularly complex due to the number of competitors; in addition, a government may 
be unable to regulate firms that are selling, but not producing, domestically (regulating 
only a fraction of active firms further adds to the complexity of incentive issues, due 
e.g., to potential collusion – as in Aubert and Pouyet, 2006). We will thus only consider 
simple instruments. 
We assume that there are credit constraints, so that if the innovator has insufficient 
initial assets,  I A < , borrowing entails costs. We focus on this situation in what follows. 
The innovator is protected by limited liability such that the opportunity costs of raising 
funds are normalized to zero. Thus, borrowing on an imperfect credit market entails a 
cost of  A) - r(I  per unit borrowed, where r(...) is an increasing function of the amount 
borrowed, A - I . Borrowing  A - I  thus imposes a total expected reimbursement of 
A) - r(I A)(1 - (I + . Let us denote by  A) - (I Π  the minimum level of profit necessary to 
be able to pay back borrowings:  A)) - r(I A)(1 - (I   A) - (I + = Π p . Given that lenders have 
complete information on the expected profits, an innovator with an idea yielding profits 
of  ) ( 2 1 A I − Π < +π π  will not receive financing. 
Governmental intervention 
The “government” is assumed to be benevolent, unless otherwise stated, and cares only 
for local welfare, not including foreign firm profits (which might be zero anyway, if 
second-period competition is strong). There are two ways for the government to 
intervene: 
-  it can grant a subsidy s,  0 s > , to the innovator,   16
-  or it can protect her from foreign competition. 
Protecting the local firm from competition increases her profits from  2 π  to 
P
2 π , where 
p
2 2 π π < . Profits under protection are an increasing function of the value for consumers 
of the good produced. Protection reduces consumers surplus, as the market is 
monopolized, from  2 CS  to 
P CS2 , 
P CS CS 2 2 > . 
When government grants a subsidy s to innovative activities, we assume that the outside 
option of relocating allows the firm to obtain a subsidy s, where s may be positive or 
zero depending on the type of industry considered. 
It is clear that government may use both instruments simultaneously. In order to assess 
their impact, we prefer to compare their relative benefits. Rather than a subsidy, the 
government may prefer to grant a subsidized loan. Yet as the innovator is protected by 
limited liability, a loan does not solve potential moral hazard issues, and would not 
differ much from a subsidy in our subsequent analysis. For clarity, we focus here on the 
simpler case of a subsidy. Further, we assume that there is no IPR protection that will 
prevent copying: for instance, the type of innovation considered may not be patentable, 
or a patent or copyright may not be enforceable worldwide. 
The government will choose a level of intervention based on the expected average 
values of π1, π2, 
P
2 π , π, CS1, CS2, and CS for the industry considered (as we do not 
specify functional forms, this computation offers little insight and is not done here). The 
next subsections investigate how the two policies affect the decision to relocate assets in 
other activities, and the decision to undertake R&D.   17
3.2. The decision to redeploy assets 
Let us consider the decision to ‘relocate assets’ at the end of the first period, that is to 
use them in an alternative use instead of continuing to produce the now mature product. 
It would be (locally) socially optimal to relocate whenever  CS L CS + < + + π π 2 2 2 . 
The innovator will decide to relocate whenever π π < 2  in the absence of protection and 
subsidization of research, when  s + <π π2  if new research activities are subsidized, and 
when  π π <
P
2  if there is protection. In this context, the last inequality is more 
demanding than the first, while the second one is less so: subsidization fosters 
relocation; protection has the opposite effect. 
Protection thus has the drawback of delaying the relocation of productive assets and 
human skills (as exemplified in mining industries in France and the United Kingdom). It 
may, however, be a beneficial strategy if L2 is very large—i.e., local employment is 
highly valued and cannot be fully relocated (L2 represents the additional value of 
employment in the first activity, compared to other local employment opportunities). 
Subsidization of research activities may be an efficient strategy if the innovator 
underinvests in the absence of intervention, which, as we argue below, is likely to be the 
case, particularly if new activities improve the local stock of knowledge (high 
externalities,  1 0 L L + ). Yet in some settings, subsidization may have the adverse effect 
of inducing inefficient relocation. However, this impact may be of limited consequence 
when one considers consumer welfare alone (when L2 is close to zero), as consumers 
will be served by foreign firms. Subsidization thus seems to fare better than protection   18
with respect to asset relocation decisions unless it involves lasting local unemployment 
or disqualification (L2 is high). 
3.3. The decision to undertake research 
It would be optimal (from the local social welfare perspective) to invest in research 
whenever 
{} [] I L L L CS CS CS p ≥ + + + + − + + + 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 ), ( max π π π .   (1) 
Yet, the innovator would decide, in the absence of government intervention, to conduct 
research if and only if 
{ } [] ) ( ) ( 0 , max 2 1 A I r A I I p − − + ≥ − + π π π .    (2) 
Several reasons may justify government intervention: 
- Imperfect market competition: As the market is monopolized in the first period, 
and unless the innovator is able to perfectly price discriminate, the innovator’s profits 
are lower than social welfare ( 0 1 > CS ) and innovation may not occur frequently 
enough. This also holds in the second period if competition remains imperfect after the 
entry of foreign competitors. 
-  Imperfect credit markets: Financing costs above the opportunity cost of funds may 
dissuade investment in a socially optimal activity. This happens if condition (1) is 
satisfied, but would not be the case if a financing cost  ) ( ) ( A I r A I − −  was added to the 
real investment cost I.   19
- Local spillovers: Last, obviously, if there are strictly positive externalities at any 
stage ( 0 > L ), then the innovator can not internalize the positive externalities of 
information leakage and of local employment, and may not innovate enough (she may 
also relocate too often as we have seen). 
All these scenarios imply that, from the local welfare perspective, the level of R&D is 
too low. 
Innovation under subsidization of research activities 
The potential innovator will invest I in R&D, under a subsidy, if and only if 
{} [] ) ( ) ( 0 ), ( max 2 1 A s I r A s I s I s p − − − − + − ≥ + − + π π π . 
Clearly, subsidization offers an immediate net gain to the investor as it reduces the 
interest rate, making more projects viable. It is particularly beneficial for small firms 
that have low levels of initial assets to be invested and also suffer from credit 
constraints. It has, however, the drawback of potentially inducing overinvestment, 
particularly by large firms that already have low interest rates thanks to self-financing. 
As with any type of grant, a subsidy may give rise to moral hazard, with beneficiaries 
diverting monetary resources to activities other than the one intended to be subsidized. 
We will briefly discuss but not model moral hazard although the issue is of interest, and 
may be why there are imperfect credit markets in the first place. We have chosen to 
focus here on externalities in the process of innovation.   20
Innovation under protection of mature firms 
The potential innovator will invest if and only if 
{ } [ ] ) ( ) ( 0 , max 2 1 A I r A I I p
P − − + ≥ + − + π π π . 
Protection from foreign competition is of more or less value depending on the firm’s 
expectations about its product’s value in the second period or, more precisely, of 
P
2 π , 
which increases with this value. Protection has no impact if the firm expects to relocate 
in the second period (a decision that may, however, be less often chosen under 
protection). Protection may foster investment in projects that have a high second-period 
value. It may thus allow for a better screening of projects in terms of their expected 
value. 
In addition, protection will allow a firm to obtain financing when its profits in the 
absence of protection were too low to ensure loan repayment: 
{}
P A I 2 1 2 1 ) ( , max π π π π π + ≤ − Π < + , where  [ ] p A I r A I I A I / ) ( ) ( ) ( − − + = − Π . This 
aspect of protection has greater impact for innovators with small initial resources A, and 
less for sectors in which innovations are undertaken by large firms. 
3.4. A discussion of some issues 
Protection and the cost of public funds 
We have seen that protection tends to inefficiently delay relocation of assets, 
particularly if there are few externalities in mature industries. However, there is one 
argument in favor of using the protection strategy, an argument that is particularly   21
relevant in the case of less developed countries. If using public funds to subsidize is 
costly, then protection of mature industries may be preferred. This effect should not be 
ignored. Spending one dollar on subsidies actually costs one dollar plus an amount 
called “the cost of public funds,” which represents, among other things, administrative 
costs, the distortionary impact of taxation, tax evasion, and corruption, and the shadow 
cost of the state’s budget constraint. It is generally believed that this cost of public funds 
is around 0.3 for the United States, between 0.3 and 0.5 for European countries and 
Japan, and above 0.7 for less developed countries (Laffont and Tirole 1993). In less 
developed countries, administrative costs tend to be high, corruption is more 
widespread, and the opportunity value of funds is also quite high. Indeed, Auriol and 
Warlters (2005) estimate that the cost of public funds amounts to 1.17 for 38 African 
countries. This high cost may explain why many less developed countries are 
particularly interested in protecting their domestic markets. 
Note in this context that moral hazard is more likely to raise issues in developing 
countries than in more developed countries (though this is not always true). If 
information asymmetries are more severe in LDCs, subsidies are at a higher risk of 
being misused – contrary to protection for which money diversion is not an issue. 
Non-benevolent governments 
When governments cannot commit, extortion or hold-up of firms’ profits is an issue ‘as 
in Ades and Di Tella (1997). In our context, fear of extortion would deter investment in 
innovation. It may also delay redeployment of assets if the new activity is more prone to 
extortion. Firm owners and managers may be expected to value non-monetary benefits 
(that cannot be seized by the government) relatively more than profits; this might favor   22
resources diversion at the innovation stage, and no redeployment during the mature 
phase. The value of subsidization is reduced from the point of view of the government 
as a non-negligible part of the subsidy is likely to be diverted. This issue is likely to be 
more relevant for some developing countries that have weak institutions. 
In democratic regimes, reelection concerns may also distort policies. Redundancy and 
bankruptcy attract media attention and may have an adverse and immediate impact on a 
politician’s chances of reelection. Anticipating this, the head of the government may 
prefer to support less risky projects or protect employment and ownership in mature 
industries. Spending time or money on firms in the early phases of the lifecycle, that is 
more useful for small firms than large ones, is less likely to attract attention and has 
medium- or long-run effects only. Protecting mature industries may thus appear a more 
attractive option, especially as it will protect against unemployment risk, which many 
politicians consider the death knell of their careers. 
A concern for reelection, as it would lead to protecting mature firms, could be formally 
similar to the government associating an excessively high value to L2. If this value is 
higher than its true level, there would be an over-emphasis on policies that delay asset 
relocation leading to inefficient, excess stability in the local industry. In the long run, 
this would deter innovation and impede growth in the region, as the products of mature 
firms eventually become obsolete, while only few local firms innovate. 
When foreign firm competition intensifies, though, as happens under increased 
globalization, protecting mature industries becomes particularly costly in terms of 
welfare. In this context, Aghion et al. (2008) introduce the notion of an escape-
competition effect where constant innovation is the only way to escape competition,   23
secure a stable market position, and guarantee at least a certain level of employment. An 
in-depth analysis of the motivations of a nonbenevolent government is outside the scope 
of our simple model, but we return to this issue in Section 5, with real-life examples. 
A summary 
To summarize, protection from competition can generally be regarded undesirable as it 
is likely to cause inefficiencies in the relocation of resources. An exception is the case 
when externalities generated by mature firms (L2 high) would be lost when relocating 
the workforce. For instance, this may occur in downsizing sectors already marked by 
high unemployment and where workers are highly specialized. Here, protection could 
be used to protect employees from unemployment and all the related social costs 
unemployment brings. Protection from competition may also be optimal for developing 
countries that lack financial resources to use other promotion tools. Last, protection may 
also be useful when subsidies are likely to be diverted from innovation activities 
because of moral hazard: in order to benefit later from protection, the firm must 
innovate now to obtain an incumbency in the future. Protection thus reinforces 
incentives to invest, contrary to subsidies, which have value both as means of 
investment, and as resources to be diverted from innovation activities. 
Subsidies may be optimal for industries undertaking high-tech and long-term or 
fundamental research, i.e., those industries in which much value is created by simply 
searching for an invention, even though the knowledge acquired along the way may not 
be directly useful to a particular innovation (L0 high). However, subsidization is not 
necessary when innovation is undertaken by large firms, or by subsidiaries of such 
firms, that do not face credit constraints.   24
In practice, the most visible government intervention tends to involve the protection of 
mature industries, possibly due to reelection concerns, as we discuss in Section 5. These 
firms are unlikely to face much credit constraint and may not generate as many 
externalities as less visible firms; their protection is thus likely to be excessive under 
non benevolent politicians. It is likely that voters are more aware of the short-term 
social adjustment costs incurred by allowing a mature firm to go bankrupt or undergo 
important restructuring, than they are of the long-term competitive benefits achieved 
through improving local knowledge stocks and hence being innovative at the 
technology frontier. As a consequence, protection becomes a more attractive policy for 
rational politicians seeking reelection. 
 
4. The Importance of Local Knowledge and Research 
Developing production processes and human capital involves important externalities, as 
has been shown by the success of high-tech “belts.” A closer examination of these 
examples highlights how internal organization and institutions have played a role in this 
success, which are exactly the type of externalities we have in mind when we refer to 
“externalities at the development stage,” denoted L1. For instance, Rosenberg (1990) 
attributes the success of the best private research laboratories (e.g., Bell Labs., IBM, 
Dupont, Dow Chemical, Eastman Kodak), and the appropriability of the fruits of their 
research, to the close intellectual proximity maintained between the basic research 
laboratories and the development and production wings of these firms (Dasgupta, 1988).   25
A comparison of the famous Silicon Valley in California with Route 128 in Boston, 
Massachusetts, is particularly interesting. Both are high-tech districts, but they evolved 
in widely divergent ways. In 1965, Route 128 had approximately three times more high-
technology employment than did Silicon Valley. Today, however, Silicon Valley is 
way, way ahead in the high-tech game. Saxenian (1994) attributes Silicon Valley’s 
success to two major differences between it and Route 128. First, companies in Silicon 
Valley relied on vertical disaggregation, from which emerged competing modular 
suppliers (Baldwin and Clark, 1997:85), whereas companies along Route 128 focused 
on vertical integration. Second, technological knowledge diffused much more rapidly in 
Silicon Valley than along Route 128. 
Knowledge diffusion is a double-edged sword. Rapid knowledge diffusion undermines 
the appropriability of “exclusive” rents arising from the lock in of knowledge. However, 
knowledge diffusion across a network of firms can act as a multiplier, resulting in the 
creation of new knowledge and, therefore, additional but “collective” rents open to all 
network participants. Of course, whether this multiplier is a benefit is criticaly 
dependent on the extent to which the individual (or firm) will have access to the 
collective rents, i.e., the intensity of knowledge diffusion. Implicit and explicit 
institutions play an important role in this context as they can provide a foundation for 
trust in reciprocity, which will help assure that each network member is willing to feed 
the network with new knowledge (Powell, 1990). 
Job hopping is one of the simplest methods of knowledge diffusion. Gilson (1999) and 
Hyde (2003) argue that the only way this type of knowledge diffusion can be stopped is 
by means of a post-employment covenant not to compete. Employees who enter into 
such covenants are not permitted to work for competitors for a fixed length of time   26
(usually two years) after termination of employment for any reason. Returning to the 
Silicon Valley vs. Route 128 example, it is interesting that Massachusetts allows 
noncompete covenants but California does not. Accordingly, “any firm connected to the 
personal networks through which information and employees flowed in Silicon Valley 
could benefit from the best innovation produced in the entire cluster rather than the best 
innovation produced by their own, proprietary research and development efforts” 
(Fallick et al., 2006). 
The Silicon Valley example highlights the advantage of unhampered knowledge flows 
over restricted knowledge flows within a regional network. In Silicon Valley, the 
absence of legal restrictions on job mobility led to a vertical disintegrated business 
culture of coopetition. Firms cooperate in creating a regional knowledge stock that, in 
turn, becomes the foundation of their competitiveness in global markets. Knowledge 
came to be seen as a regional club good and each company connected to the network 
could benefit from it. This resulted in a regional “standing-on-shoulders” effect that 
gained companies a competitive advantage over regions where companies could build 
only on their own internal knowledge. However, such an environment can exist only 
when there is trust in reciprocity (Powell, 1990), i.e., the absence of free-riding. Every 
rational company would desire to benefit from other firms’ ideas and knowledge 
circulation within the network while, at the same time, locking in its own knowledge. If 
this was a dominant strategy, the regional standing-on-shoulders effect would not occur. 
However, if the law eliminates the possibility of locking in knowledge—as in 
California—cooperation becomes the dominant strategy and thus helps overcome 
problems of collective action that would eventually produce a regional disadvantage. In   27
the absence of external institutions, social sanctions, acting as a kind of informal 
institution, can produce the same result (Ellickson, 1991). 
Given the comparative advantage of regional cooperation over isolation, it becomes 
desirable to engage in a network strategy such that it is in each company’s own interest 
to cooperate, leading to an intense flow of knowledge. However, in the absence of 
explicit institutions, there is a risk of free-riding that can be avoided only by adequate 
implicit trust-supporting institutions. Depending on the regional network’s structure, 
there are two ways of generating trust, both relying on a firm’s regional embeddedness. 
In networks of equals (i.e., small and medium-sized firms) where firms are usually 
owner led, trust results from the owner’s regional embeddedness and his or her social 
ties. The literature on industrial districts (Piore and Sable, 1984; Becattini, 1990) 
highlights the advantages of coopetition resulting from trust in reciprocity due to strong 
social ties. The stronger the social ties within a network, the higher the probability of 
being caught out as a free-rider. If free-riding leads to an exclusion from the network, its 
costs usually exceed its benefits. Well-known examples of districts using social ties as a 
regulation are the textile and leather industry in northern Italy and manufacturing 
industry in southern Germany. These strongly export-oriented manufacturing sectors 
with many small and medium-sized companies, often family-owned, are highly 
specialized and yet competitive in the global market. However, as they usually serve 
niche markets, they are not highly visible and are rather “hidden champions.” 
In the case of hierarchical networks dominated by a large firm, trust does not prevail per 
se. Large companies’ organizational structures are usually not compatible with 
relationships based on social ties. In this environment, the big player’s potential to 
become a real champion is determined by its ability to act as a network pilot. As a   28
network pilot, the real champion needs to convince other firms in the region of the 
network’s profitability. To do so, game theory would suggest the importance of a 
positive signal, usually some kind of self-commitment, from the network pilot. In giving 
this signal, the network pilot demonstrates its commitment to the network and thus 
contributes to strengthening and expanding the network. This idea is complementary to 
the French view of a national champion which stresses such an entity’s social 
responsibility. Social responsibility should be understood as all efforts contributing to 
build up, foster, and intensify the network. 
Thus, once a network pilot has managed to build up a regional network, i.e., the network 
pilot has gained other companies’ trust, additional social responsibilities come into play. 
At this point, the entire network of firms needs to engage in various regional activities 
so as to stimulate regional dynamics and thus generate positive externalities for its 
members. With regard to network care and development, the network pilot may still 
bear most of the responsibility, but maintaining the network is in the pilot’s own self-
interest and thus the costs of the obligation (time and expense) can be justified. 
However, to create and maintain an all-embracing regional network, the large company 
members must not be too dominant and positive externalities from participating must be 
perceptible to all members, independent of size. This is especially important as small 
companies are believed to be a driving force of innovation (Audretsch, 1995). Thus, 
supporting small companies and startups means that fresh knowledge will be produced, 
eventually increasing the network’s pool of knowledge. One way to contribute to 
knowledge production is to provide corporate venture capital to startups (Gompers, 
2002); another way is to join forces with universities.   29
Other social responsibilities profitably engaged in by a regional network of firms might 
include sponsoring and donating to cultural institutions, e.g., festivals, concerts, 
exhibitions, and other bohemian projects in the region. This activity will enhance a 
region’s amenities and make it more attractive to creative persons or those with high 
potential, thus not only keeping the current labor pool in place but expanding it with 
highly skilled workers (Glaeser et al., 2001; Florida, 2002). 
 
5. Strategic and Political Reasons to Promote Champions 
5.1. Supporting the Lame Ducks 
As discussed in Section 3, it may be welfare-increasing to protect mature firms in the 
presence of specialized employment, tacit knowledge, and local networks. However, 
there may be other, nonbenevolent reasons why a public authority may want to 
intervene and favor insufficiently competitive firms (lame ducks). 
Strategic trade policy or how to beggar your neighbor 
One argument for supporting “lame ducks” is found in the strategic trade policy 
literature. Let us assume that there is a market for some arbitrary good. The market is 
characterized by worldwide imperfect competition and suppliers from around the world 
compete to capture excess rents. To retain the largest possible share of the excess rents 
within national borders, governments may be inclined to artificially bolster the position 
of domestic firms in this market, perhaps through state aid. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Spencer and Brander (1983) presented a theory of government 
intervention explaining industrial strategy. Positive welfare effects from subsidization of 
local firms are not guaranteed, for at least two reasons. First, local firms operating in   30
imperfect markets do not earn excess rents only from foreign markets but also from 
home markets, leading to a loss of consumer surplus in the home country. This is 
reflected by  CS CS
P < 2 in our model. Second, the subsidy-ridden noncooperative 
international equilibrium is suboptimal, leading to subsidy wars. The multilateral 
prohibition of subsidies, should such an agreement prove possible, would increase the 
welfare of all countries. 
National champions are mortal 
Another argument for protecting established firms in the temporary presence of sizable 
externalities (i.e., L2 becomes negligible with time) involves structural change and 
unemployment. Cohen (1995:30) states that “there is little need to dwell upon the lame 
ducks other than to remind the reader that a national champion is mortal.” A dynamic 
economy, by definition, undergoes constant structural change, due, among other things, 
to different industry growth rates of production and demand (for an overview, see Pianta 
and Vivarelli, 2007). Structural change has geographical implications, too, as industries 
are not evenly distributed geographically (for a European discussion, see Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman, 2002). Industries that do not change and grow will eventually 
die. This will, obviously, have serious negative effects on employment in the short-run 
but industry death can have long-term effects on employment too, particularly when the 
labor market is inflexible and immobile (externality  2 L  in our model). In this situation, 
state intervention can merely delay the inevitable, but politicians, with short-term 
horizons, especially when up for reelection, may wish to smooth out the process of 
decline and thus ease social tension. A famous example is former German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder’s 1999 attempt to rescue one of the biggest construction companies in   31
Germany—Philipp Holzmann AG. Due to mismanagement and a far-too-optimistic 
view concerning a possible construction boom in Eastern Germany, Philipp Holzmann 
AG accumulated more than 2.4 billion German marks of debt, which put the firm’s 
survival in great danger. In a highly visible and celebrated move, Chancellor Schröder 
offered debt guarantees from the state. However, the firm’s death was only delayed, not 
averted, and in early 2002, Philipp Holzmann AG went bankrupt. 
This “save the lame duck at all costs” phenomenon is also found in the banking sector, 
as reported by Vives (2001). Politicians are apparently very taken with the idea that a 
national champion in the form of a bank must not be allowed to fail as the fallout would 
be so bad for national industry. Particularly large banks are believed to be “too big to 
fail.” This was the case for the French Credit Lyonnais, which began to founder in the 
early 1990s due to poor management and fraud (Vives 2001), but was not allowed to die 
a natural death. This sort of big champion is indeed mortal, but because it is “too big to 
fail,” it becomes a big-project firm, as discussed next. 
5.2. The temptation to support “big-project” firms 
High visibility 
The French Concorde project is an excellent example of Seabright’s (2005) point that 
politicians are tempted to select for public investment support those projects that are 
both highly visible in the media and comparatively insulated from competition. Being 
more or less isolated from competition, the project failed because it was more engineer- 
than customer-driven. Another example is the European Airbus project. The Airbus 
project has been celebrated in the media as a shining example of successful European 
champion-oriented industrial policy. Indeed, there is a simulation study by Neven and 
Seabright (1995) concluding that Airbus was likely to earn a comfortable rate of return   32
on the public investment made. Thus, it was a good investment from a pure rate of 
return perspective. However, the effect of Airbus’ entry on consumer surplus is not 
clear: the gains from competition may be offset by lost economies of scale and the 
Airbus-induced exit of McDonnell-Douglas. In our model, we assume that competition 
benefits consumer welfare,  2 2 CS CS
P < , as this is the most common case (all potential 
beneficial effects from protection are embedded in profits 
P
2 π  and externalities  2 L ). In 
the absence of competition, however, there is no guarantee that the benefits from 
economies of scale will be passed on to consumers. 
Strategic industries and security of supply 
Yet another reason advanced for government intervention has to do with security of 
supply. Strategic industries that secure national supply with essential resources produce 
an externality  2 L  different form employment that might also justify state intervention. 
Take the European gas market as an example. Only a small fraction of total European 
gas consumption is actually produced in Europe. Much of the gas is imported from 
politically unstable countries, making disruption of supply quite possible. Gas is mainly 
transported via inter-urban pipelines, another source of risk, both political and physical. 
Moreover, construction of pipelines results in high sunk costs. As national production is 
limited, the only way to reduce these risks is to diversify gas imports, that is, build more 
pipelines, leading, of course, to even higher sunk costs. Therefore, it is often argued that 
a national or European firm (a heavyweight champion) is needed to guarantee the 
security of gas supply. And, it then seems acceptable that a vertically integrated gas 
supplier will earn excess profits from consumers on its home market to compensate it 
for investing in the very expensive, but necessary for diversity and safety, pipelines and   33
other infrastructure. Indeed, this argument was viewed favorably and perhaps had a 
hand in the eventual approval of the merger of E.ON and Ruhrgas. E.ON, already one of 
Germany’s largest energy companies, intended to acquire a 60% majority in the gas 
company Ruhrgas, resulting in E.ON/Ruhrgas becoming Europe’s biggest energy 
company. Preliminarily, permission for the merger was denied by the Federal Cartel 
Office on the grounds that the merger would have detrimentally strengthen E.ON’s 
already dominant position. However, the merger gained ministerial approval for reasons 
of security of supply (for details, see Sinn 2002). 
Nevertheless, natural monopolies (characterized by high sunk costs) can erode over 
time—especially through technical progress. The supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
which is transported by specially designed sea vessels and road tankers, may, in the 
future, increase, thus diversifying gas supply and reducing reliance on pipelines, making 
state protection of the pipeline owners (the heavyweight champions) less desirable, a 
turn of events predicted by our model: protection delays relocation decisions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this contribution was to provide a different approach from that usually found 
in the literature on national-champion-oriented policies. While the existing literature 
mainly concentrates on the distribution of rents, we look at their creation. In doing so, 
we adopt an evolutionary perspective and consider how government intervention along 
the product lifecycle can alter a firm’s incentives to (i) invest in R&D in the early phase 
of the lifecycle and (ii) relocate resources during later phases of the lifecycle when the 
product is mature. In a simple model, we analyze a firm’s decision on whether or not to   34
invest in research, given that there are knowledge spillovers. Such spillovers carry the 
risk of imitation by foreign firms, and that discourages research investment. Yet 
knowledge spillovers also play an important role in geographical location decisions to 
the extent that they generate positive regional externalities. 
We assess the impact of subsidizing research during early stages of the lifecycle and the 
impact of protecting firms in mature industries. We find certain situations where 
subsidization of SMEs is an efficient strategy, including those cases (1) where credit 
constraints prevent small and medium-sized firms from entering the market, thus 
hindering the positive entry competition effect, and (2) where subsidies have a 
multiplicative effect by creating spillovers in the early phase of the lifecycle. Protection 
from competition may also be efficient when public funds are costly or when monetary 
resources may be diverted rather than invested. However, note that these findings are 
only applicable to competitive economies at the technology frontier and under the 
assumption of a benevolent government. Our real-world examples show that subsidizing 
historically produced undesired results as politicians seeking reelection concentrated on 
protecting firms in the mature phase of the lifecycle. This evidence suggests a skeptical 
view of the value of protection and such a policy should be approached with great 
caution, especially during an election cycle when the assumption of a “benevolent” 
politician might be particularly inadequate. 
Supra-national bodies such as the European Union may limit the discretion of 
politicians, and mutual scrutiny from its members may be useful in this context. 
However,  indirect promotion, by means of providing an innovation-supportive 
environment, may hold greater promise. A proper environment may include local   35
transportation infrastructure along with supporting institutions such as business 
incubators, universities, research institutes, etc.; that is, institutions that support local 
knowledge flows but whose products benefit the entire region, not just one company. 
This kind of policy, which is aimed at local championship instead of national or 
European champions, is becoming increasingly popular and is known as cluster-oriented 
policy (Porter, 1998).   36
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